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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the time that it takes you to read this sentence, more than 11 million 
new emails will have been sent worldwide.1  Email is just one of the many 
forms of electronic communication in the 21st century.  The advent of the 
Internet transformed our society and enabled a world of hyper-
connectivity and instant communication with each other, as well as 
seemingly limitless access to information.  The often-ignored reality of 
technological advances in electronic communication is that with each new 
development comes the increased potential for an invasion of privacy.  
Before the telegraph, the only way to intercept communication between 
individuals meant overhearing a conversation or somehow obtaining a 
physical letter.2  Then, it became possible to intercept the electrical signals 
sent by a telegraph to decipher the electronic communication.3  Later, with 
the invention of the telephone came more advanced wiretapping, 
specifically the ability to listen to conversations without any physical 
presence at either end of the conversation.4  Now with the popularity of 
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 1.   An estimated 205.6 billion emails were sent and received per day in 2015, an expected 215.6 
billion emails in 2016. THE RADICATI GROUP, INC., EMAIL STATISTICS REPORT, 2015-2019 4 (2015), 
http://www.radicati.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Email-Statistics-Report-2015-2019-
Executive-Summary.pdf.  
 2.   See generally Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment protects sealed letters in the mail). 
 3.   See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465–66 (1928) (holding that Fourth 
Amendment does not extend to wiretapping), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
 4.   See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 352–53 (noting that the Fourth Amendment can protect oral 
statements overheard without any technical trespass).  But see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–
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email, text messaging, and other forms of internet communication, it is 
possible to intercept and easily create a comprehensive account of a 
person’s conversations.  By combining the content (e.g. the actual words 
spoken or written) of the communications themselves and the supporting 
non-content information—including, among other things, the time, length, 
and identities of sender and receiver—a much more accurate record of an 
individual’s communications can be compiled than previously possible.5 
One remarkable aspect of these advances in electronic 
communications is how little control average consumers have over their 
emails, text messages, and phone conversations.  Once an email or text 
message is sent, or a phone call made, the relevant service provider obtains 
certain data about that communication.  In the short term, for example, 
sending a text message creates a record that contains the content of the 
message, the numbers of both parties, and the date and time of the 
message.6  This data will then be stored somewhere on a server owned by 
the service provider, a decision that is entirely unregulated by any 
governing body.7  Usually it is a purely business-minded decision.  
Microsoft, for example, initially stores customer emails and 
communications data from the popular Outlook.com email service at the 
closest datacenter to the location provided during the initial subscription 
of a particular customer.8  Later, Microsoft transfers the data to a different 
datacenter according to the location the user provided when they initially 
                                                          
44 (1979) (holding that Fourth Amendment does not apply to pen registers because there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily given to a third party).   
 5.   See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510–11 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that 
email headers and IP addresses are akin to pen registers and have no Fourth Amendment protection).  
But see United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 282 (6th Cir. 2010) (concluding that an ISP cannot 
be compelled to turn over the contents of a subscriber’s emails because doing so would violate the 
subscriber’s reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment). 
 6.   See Joseph B. Evans, Cell Phone Forensics: Powerful Tools Wielded by Federal 
Investigators, FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.: JCFL BLOG (June 2, 2016), 
https://news.law.fordham.edu/jcfl/2016/06/02/cell-phone-forensics-powerful-tools-wielded-by-
federal-investigators/.  Notably, there is no current law in place that requires wireless carriers to store 
the content of text messages, so none of the major carriers store this portion of the record long-term.  
See id. (explaining that most carriers will delete the contents of text messages “after delivering them” 
but will retain the transactional data for “sixty days to seven years”).  
 7.   While there are statutes regulating electronic communications, discussed infra, these laws 
do not seek to control the physical location of servers because the internet spans across borders.  
Nonetheless, our data privacy laws resemble a “patch-work quilt,” in that regulations are implemented 
on an industry-by-industry basis and different forms of data are subject to vastly different regulations.  
See Lisa J. Sotto & Aaron P. Simpson, United States, in DATA PROTECTION & PRIVACY 208–14 
(Rosemary P. Jay ed., 2015), https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/18/2011/ 
04/DDP2015_United_States.pdf.   
 8.   Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re a Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account 
Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.), 829 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 2017 
U.S. LEXIS 6343 (Oct. 16, 2017). 
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signed up for Outlook, but ultimately Microsoft has full discretion to 
control where the data is located at any given time.9 
Sometimes this results in U.S.-based customers’ emails and other 
relevant data being stored in a separate state, but still within the 
jurisdiction of the U.S. government.  But more often the service providers 
move the data to servers located in foreign countries, where they have 
installed datacenters to take advantage of favorable tax benefits and other 
cost savings.  These business decisions have the unfortunate effect of 
potentially bringing the data out of the reach of lawful criminal 
investigations seeking warrants in U.S. courts.  One example is the recent 
Microsoft v. United States case, in which the Second Circuit overturned a 
lower court’s order that Microsoft produce a customer’s email data stored 
in Dublin, Ireland.10  In another example, Google has attempted to build 
off-shore data barges that would be outside the jurisdiction of any 
sovereign nation.11 
The law’s responses to the advance in electronic communications is 
notable.  Only within the last fifty years has Congress brought electronic 
transmissions within the confines of Fourth Amendment protection, 
namely through the enactment of the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act and the Stored Communications Act.12  Because the Fourth 
Amendment’s text only covers individuals’ “persons, houses, papers, and 
effects,”13 the legislature and judiciary initially resisted extending 
protections beyond this literal language (i.e. when a new technology is 
developed), but eventually viewed the protections as necessary with the 
passing of time and increasing societal adoption of new technologies.14  
Recently, the Supreme Court has grappled with the Fourth Amendment’s 
application to the cellphone, and its more clever cousin the 
                                                          
 9.   See id. at 203 (“One of Microsoft’s datacenters is located in Dublin, Ireland, where it is 
operated by a wholly owned Microsoft subsidiary.  According to Microsoft, when its system 
automatically determines, ‘based on [the user’s] country code,’ that storage for an e-mail account 
‘should be migrated to the Dublin datacenter,’ it transfers the data associated with the account to that 
location.  Before making the transfer, it does not verify user identity or location; it simply takes the 
user-provided information at face value, and its systems migrate the data according to company 
protocol.” (citations omitted)). 
 10.   See id. at 200–02. 
 11.   See generally Steven R. Swanson, Google Sets Sail: Ocean-Based Server Farms and 
International Law, 43 CONN. L. REV. 709, 716–19 (2011) (describing Google’s patent application for 
a water-based data center and its potential to operate outside the jurisdiction of any country’s laws). 
 12.   See infra Part II.B (discussing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and enactment of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act and Stored Communications Act). 
 13.   U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 14.   See supra notes 2–5. 
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“smartphone.”15  Some commentators argue that Riley v. California, in 
which the Court held that digital information contained in a cellphone 
could not be searched absent a warrant, should be extended to include 
other modern “smart” technologies,16 like smartwatches and fitness 
tracking devices.17 
A recent case is representative of the difficulties courts face when 
interpreting laws that may no longer be sufficient in light of modern 
changes in technology.  In Microsoft Corp. v. United States, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the Stored Communications Act 
(“SCA”) to conclude that Microsoft did not have to comply with a 
warrant—issued under Section 2703 of the SCA—to produce emails 
stored on a server in a foreign country because the statute did not explicitly 
or implicitly authorize an extraterritorial application.18  While this 
interpretation is both legally and textually sound, the Second Circuit’s 
decision is quite troublesome because the district court’s reasoning was 
equally sound.  The problem lies with the ambiguity found in Section 2703 
of the SCA.  Taking this a step further, the SCA as a whole has largely 
become obsolete over time and if no changes are made the statute will be 
become inconsistent with evolving Fourth Amendment protections and 
privacy law doctrines as applied to current and future technologies.  This 
Note argues that warrants issued under the Stored Communications Act 
(“SCA warrants”) should be treated not as traditional search warrants but 
rather as subpoenas, or possibly a “hybrid” somewhere between the two, 
at least until Congress updates the SCA to reflect modern technological 
advances. 
Part II.A of this Note provides a background of Fourth Amendment 
privacy issues arising from searches of digital technologies.  Additionally, 
Part II.B explores the legislative history of the SCA and how 
interpretations of the statute have changed over time.  Part II.C then 
outlines the facts, procedural history, and rationale behind the holdings of 
Microsoft v. United States.  Building upon this background, Part III.A 
argues that courts should treat SCA warrants in such a way that does not 
                                                          
 15.   See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2477 (2014) (holding that officers must have 
a warrant to search digital information on a cellphone seized after an individual’s arrest).   
 16.   The difference between a “smart” and “dumb” technology is the “combination of services, 
trust, and ease of use” that accompany smart devices.  See generally James Schaefer, Smart Devices - 
What Makes Them “Smart”?, LEVERAGE BLOG, https://www.leverege.com/blogpost/smart-devices-
what-makes-them-smart (last visited Oct. 17, 2017). 
 17.   See, e.g., Katharine Saphner, Note, You Should Be Free to Talk the Talk and Walk the Walk: 
Applying Riley v. California to Smart Activity Trackers, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1689, 1692 (2016). 
 18.   Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re a Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account 
Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.), 829 F.3d 197, 200–01 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 
2017 U.S. LEXIS 6343 (Oct. 16, 2017); see also infra Part II.C (discussing Microsoft v. United States). 
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force the court to engage in analysis of extraterritoriality.  Further, Part 
III.B explains some of the policy outcomes that result from either 
interpretation of the SCA and lays the foundation for Congress to update 
the outdated statute.  Finally, Part III.C offers some suggestions to amend 
or replace the SCA to address the aforementioned issues, as well as 
providing a sustainable solution for future technological advances. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A. Right to Privacy and the Fourth Amendment 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis first conceived the idea of an 
individual’s right to privacy in 1890.19  A full analysis of the right to 
privacy is beyond the scope of this Note, but to briefly summarize, there 
are five dominant species of privacy that have emerged over the past 
century: 1) tort privacy, 2) Fourth Amendment privacy, 3) First 
Amendment privacy, 4) fundamental-decision privacy,20 and 5) State 
constitutional privacy.21  Since just before the beginning of the Twenty-
First Century, privacy in each of these five forms has been a focal point of 
many different hot-button issues in American law,22 including abortion,23 
the right-to-die,24 drug testing in the workplace,25 homosexuality,26 and 
drunk-driving roadblocks.27  There have been numerous federal statutes 
enacted to protect privacy in many areas.28  Needless to say, privacy is 
fundamental to American law in many ways. 
                                                          
 19.   Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 
(1890) (“Political, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the common 
law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society.”). 
 20.   Fundamental-decision privacy involves those fundamental personal decisions that are 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Ken Gormley, One Hundred 
Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1340, 1391–1420 (discussing fundamental-decision 
privacy). 
 21.   See generally id. (discussing history of privacy in American law). 
 22.   Id. at 1342 (“[A]ll of these issues central to our society involve . . . an investigation of the 
legal concept of privacy, as that term has gained variegated meaning by the year 1992.”). 
 23.   E.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (fundamental-decision 
privacy). 
 24.   E.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (fundamental-decision 
privacy). 
 25.   E.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) (Fourth Amendment privacy). 
 26.   E.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (fundamental-decision privacy); 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (same). 
 27.   E.g., Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (Fourth Amendment and state 
constitutional privacy). 
 28.   For a fairly concise summary of privacy-focused law, including federal and state statutes, 
U.S. and state constitutional protections, and international privacy protections, see DANIEL J. SOLOVE 
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According to some commentators, the Fourth Amendment is likely the 
most fundamental form of privacy protection in American law.29  The 
Fourth Amendment provides: 
 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.30 
For most of the early history of the United States, the Court considered the 
Fourth Amendment a property right that prevented the government from 
unlawfully entering someone’s home or taking possession of their tangible 
property.31  The Supreme Court, however, significantly expanded Fourth 
Amendment protections over time to include areas outside the home and 
to accommodate technological changes in society. 
First, in Olmstead v. United States, the Supreme Court held that 
wiretapping of telephone lines was not a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment because no “search” or “seizure” had taken place.32  Justice 
Brandeis, aware of the privacy concerns that accompanied changes in 
technology, wrote a dissenting opinion that echoed his previous beliefs 
about the right to privacy.33  Forty years later, the Supreme Court overruled 
Olmstead and extended Fourth Amendment rights beyond property 
interests in Katz v. United States.34  There, the Court established the 
                                                          
& PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS (2015). 
 29.   See, e.g., Gormley, supra note 20, at 1357–74 (discussing Fourth Amendment privacy 
throughout the history of American jurisprudence). 
 30.   U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 31.   The prohibition against “unreasonable searches and seizures” grew from the strong, 
property-minded principle that a “man’s house is his castle.”  See Gormley, supra note 20, at 1358–
59.  Later, Boyd v. United States was the first time the Supreme Court concluded that the Fourth 
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government was akin to a 
privacy right.  See Gormley, supra note 20, at 1359 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625–
26 (1886)).   
 32.   277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (“Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many federal 
decisions brought to our attention hold the Fourth Amendment to have been violated as against a 
defendant, unless there has been an official search and seizure of his person or such a seizure of his 
papers or his tangible material effects or an actual physical invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ for the 
purpose of making a seizure.”), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger 
v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
 33.   Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading 
privacy have become available to the government.  Discovery and invention have made it possible for 
the government . . . to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet.”); see also Warren 
& Brandeis, supra note 19.  
 34.   See 389 U.S. 347, 351, 353 (1967). 
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“reasonable expectation of privacy” test in applying the Fourth 
Amendment.35 
In Katz, the government introduced evidence of a telephone 
conversation that the FBI had obtained via an electronic recording device 
placed on a public, glass telephone booth.36  The Court’s prior decisions 
focusing on physical trespass failed to recognize and properly account for 
advances in technology, a factor implicit in its holding that such 
surveillance (wiretapping a public telephone booth) was not permissible 
under the Fourth Amendment.37  The Court rejected the government’s 
visibility argument, distinguishing between “the intruding eye” and “the 
uninvited ear.”38  Further, the Court concluded, in accordance with the 
Fourth Amendment, that “[w]herever a man may be, he is entitled to know 
that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”39 
Some years later, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of what 
constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure when it determined that 
individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in information 
voluntarily disclosed to third parties.40  This rule became known in Fourth 
Amendment law as the “third-party doctrine.”41  Legal scholars have 
widely criticized the third-party doctrine since its inception, and some state 
courts have even outright rejected it under the equivalent state 
constitutional provisions, yet the doctrine remains valid law.42  There are 
                                                          
 35.   Id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 36.   Id. at 348, 352. 
 37.   See id. at 353, 357–59 (“The Government’s activities in electronically listening to and 
recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the 
telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.”). 
 38.   Id. at 352.  The Court reasoned that Katz did not shed his privacy rights “simply because he 
made his calls from a place where he might be seen,” but in fact took affirmative steps (shutting the 
door of the phone booth) to prevent others from hearing his phone conversations and keep them 
private.  See id.  
 39.   Id. at 359; see also id. at 351 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”). 
 40.   See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976) (“This Court has held repeatedly 
that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party 
and conveyed by him to Government authorities . . . .”); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335–
36 (1973) (“[T]here can be little expectation of privacy where records are handed to an accountant, 
knowing that mandatory disclosure of much of the information therein is required in an income tax 
return.”). 
 41.   See, e.g., Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the Third Party Doctrine 
Should Not Apply, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (2013) (“Dubbed the Third Party Doctrine, it states that a 
person loses Fourth Amendment protection—i.e., does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy—
to any communications that the person voluntary discloses to another.”). 
 42.   See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563–
64 (2009) [hereinafter Kerr, Case for Third-Party Doctrine] (stating that the third-party doctrine is 
“the Fourth Amendment rule scholars love to hate.  It is the Lochner of search and seizure law,” but 
providing a defense of the doctrine) (footnote omitted); see also id. at 563 n.5 (citing major criticisms 
466 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 66 
some exceptions to the third-party doctrine, developed both within the 
judiciary43 and through federal legislation.44  The judicial exceptions to the 
third-party doctrine consist of areas outside the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment and that are already addressed in other bodies of law that 
deter governmental abuse of the use of secret agents.45  Legislation has 
typically been enacted in response to specific cases.  For example, to 
prevent the use of pen registers without a warrant, Congress enacted the 
Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices Statute46 after Smith v. 
Maryland, in which the Court held their warrantless use permissible under 
the Fourth Amendment.47  Other federal statutes include the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”),48 the Right to Financial Privacy 
Act (“RFPA”),49 the Cable Act,50 and the Video Privacy Protection Act.51 
B. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act and Stored 
Communications Act 
The relevant exception in this Note is the ECPA.  In 1986, Congress’ 
main goal in enacting the ECPA was to update the nearly twenty-year-old 
Federal Wiretap Act to cover newer communication technologies, namely 
computer-based communications and other forms of digital 
communication.52  The ECPA consists of three parts53: Title I is the 
updated Federal Wiretap Act and covers the interception of any wire, oral, 
                                                          
of the third-party doctrine); but see United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (“More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”). 
 43.   See Kerr, Case for Third-Party Doctrine, supra note 42, at 590–96 (discussing judicially-
created alternatives to Fourth Amendment protections). 
 44.   See id. at 596–97 (discussing statutory protections in response to Miller and the third-party 
doctrine, including: Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–27 (2012); 
Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–22 (2006); Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act, 45 C.F.R. § 164 (2007); and the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 
(2012)). 
 45.   Id. at 591. 
 46.   18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–27 (2012); Kerr, Case for Third-Party Doctrine, supra note 42, at 596.  
 47.   442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979). 
 48.   Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848, 1848–73 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 18 U.S.C.). 
 49.   12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–22 (2012 & Supp. 2015) (concerning financial records stored by a 
financial institution).  
 50.   47 U.S.C. § 551(h) (2012) (concerning cable company records). 
 51.   18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012) (concerning the disclosure of video rental or sale records).  
 52.   See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, JUSTICE INFORMATION SHARING, 
https://it.ojp.gov/privacyliberty/authorities/statutes/1285 (last visited Sept. 30, 2017). 
 53.   See id.  Titles I and III are irrelevant for my purposes and thus outside the scope of this Note, 
so I will limit my analysis as appropriate. 
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or electronic communication,54 Title II is known as the Stored 
Communications Act (“SCA”) which protects content and subscriber 
records held by a service provider about or from a subscriber,55 and Title 
III addresses “pen registers and trap and trace devices.”56 
1. Overview of the Stored Communications Act 
The SCA “was enacted to extend to electronic records privacy 
protections analogous to those provided by the Fourth Amendment.”57  
Specifically, the SCA protected electronic communication services and 
remote computing services, distinctions that accurately reflected the 
common understandings of how computer networks functioned at that 
time (i.e. in 1986).58  Generally, service providers are prohibited from 
disclosing the records provided to them by their subscribers, although the 
SCA creates several exceptions to the general obligations of non-
disclosure.59  While not directly relevant to the arguments presented in this 
Note, it is helpful to understand the overall structure of the SCA as 
enacted.  The beginning section of the SCA imposes criminal punishments 
for unauthorized use of a service provider’s facilities used for storage of 
electronic communication services.60  Unauthorized use can either be 
when one “accesses without authorization,” or when one “exceeds an 
authorization to access . . . and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents 
authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in 
electronic storage. . . .”61 
                                                          
 54.   Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848, 1848–59 (1986); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2012 & Supp. 
2015).  
 55.   Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860–68 (1986); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2012 & Supp. 
2015).  
 56.   Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848, 1868–73 (1986); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–27 (2012).  
 57.   Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re a Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account 
Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.), 829 F.3d 197, 206 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Gov’t Br. at 
29 (citing S. Comm. on Judiciary, Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, S. Rep. No. 99–
541, at 5 (1986)), cert. granted, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 6343 (Oct. 16, 2017); see also Orin S. Kerr, The 
Next Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 373, 382–86 (2014) [hereinafter 
Kerr, Next Generation] (discussion of ECPA). 
 58.   See Microsoft v. United States, 829 F.3d at 206 (citing Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the 
Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 
1213–14 (2004) [hereinafter Kerr, A User’s Guide]) (noting that electronic communications services 
and remote computing services were probably more distinguishable at the time of enactment than they 
are today). 
 59.   Id. at 207. 
 60.   See 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012). 
 61.   Id.  Although not explicitly defined in the statute, unauthorized use of electronic storage 
devices or computer equipment can be accomplished by physically entering the facility without 
authorization or by “hacking” the computer systems to access the facility. See Orin S. Kerr, 
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As noted, the second section of the SCA imposes a duty of non-
disclosure of electronic communications and customer records upon 
service providers with certain limited exceptions.62  The SCA 
distinguishes between “contents of a communication” and “customer 
records.”63  Section 2703 then establishes conditions under which a service 
provider is required to disclose the contents of stored communications or 
non-content related customer information.64  The provisions of Section 
2703 address governmental access to service provider records in a 
“pyramidal structure.”65  First, the government can obtain from a service 
provider the most basic non-content information, which includes: name, 
address, telephone connection records (session times and durations), 
length of service, types of service utilized, telephone numbers and other 
subscriber numbers or identities, and means or source of payment.66  This 
can be done with relative ease: the government can obtain a warrant, court 
order, administrative subpoena, or consent of the customer, but is not 
required to do so as long as it is seeking only the non-content 
information.67  Should the government choose to obtain a court order, it 
may obtain additional non-content records upon a showing of “specific 
and articulable facts showing . . . reasonable grounds to believe that the 
contents . . . or the records . . . are relevant and material to an ongoing 
criminal investigation.”68 
Content information—the contents of the electronic communication 
itself (i.e. the message, text, etc.)—may be obtained without notice to the 
customer by a warrant (“SCA warrant”)69 or with notice by an 
administrative subpoena or court order.70  Additional limitations are placed 
on the obtainability of the content information depending on how recently 
the user made the communications.71  The strictest requirements are found 
                                                          
Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1596, 1600 (2003). 
 62.   See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (duty of non-disclosure) and (b) (listed exceptions) (2012).  
 63.   See id. § 2702(b), (c). 
 64.   See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012). 
 65.   Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re a Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account 
Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.), 829 F.3d 197, 207 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 2017 
U.S. LEXIS 6343 (Oct. 16, 2017). 
 66.   § 2703(c)(2). 
 67.   See id. § 2703(c). 
 68.   Id. § 2703(d). 
 69.   Id. § 2703(b)(1)(A) (“Contents of wire or electronic communications [may be obtained] . . . 
without required notice to the subscriber or customer, if the governmental entity obtains a warrant 
issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure . . . .”). 
 70.   Id. § 2703(b)(1)(B). 
 71.   See id. § 2703(a) (noting different protections for electronic storage more than 180 days old 
2017 EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION 469 
in Section 2703(a), which states that for content records made and stored 
within the past 180 days the government is required to obtain an SCA 
warrant.72  For content records in storage for more than 180 days the 
provisions of Section 2703(b) apply, and an SCA warrant must only be 
obtained if the government is not willing to provide notice to the 
customer.73 
As with any federal law, courts interpret the provisions of the SCA 
based on congressional intent, starting with the explicit statutory 
language.74  Where the language is clear and unambiguous, the analysis 
ends and the statute is interpreted based on the plain meaning of the terms 
used.75  But where the language is ambiguous, courts turn to the “statutory 
structure, relevant legislative history, [and] congressional purposes.”76  
The structure of the SCA echoes traditional Fourth Amendment privacy 
protections for physical objects, especially the home, by creating similar 
protections for digital and electronic communications that have been 
disclosed to a third-party service provider.77  Previously, the Constitution 
placed no disclosure limits on service providers—because of the third-
party doctrine—and so the government could obtain any records with a 
subpoena and no requirement of notice or consent to the customer.78  In 
enacting the SCA, Congress brought digital and electronic 
communications out of the scope of the third-party doctrine by defining 
methods for governmental access.79  The legislative history of the SCA 
can help courts determine congressional intent regarding specific issues, 
for example the extraterritorial reach of the SCA as discussed later.80  The 
congressional purpose is rather clear—the SCA is a privacy-focused law 
geared towards electronic communications taking place on computer 
networks and thereby disclosed to third-party service providers.81 
                                                          
versus 180 days or less). 
 72.   Id. 
 73.   Id. § 2703(a), (b)(1)(A). 
 74.   In re a Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft 
Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 
(2004)) (“In construing federal law, the ‘starting point in discerning congressional intent is the existing 
statutory language.’”), rev’d, 829 F.3d 197, 207 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 6343 
(Oct. 16, 2017). 
 75.   Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999). 
 76.   In re Microsoft, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 471 (quoting Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 
729, 737 (1985)). 
 77.   Id. (quoting Kerr, A User’s Guide, supra note 58, at 1209–13). 
 78.   See Kerr, A User’s Guide, supra note 58 at 1209–13. 
 79.   See id.  
 80.   See infra Part II.C (discussing recent interpretation of the extraterritoriality of the SCA). 
 81.   See Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re a Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account 
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2. Application of the SCA as Technology Advances 
When Congress enacted the SCA in 1986, electronic communications 
were still relatively new.  Americans did not use email nearly as widely as 
today, mostly due to the modern prominence of personal computing82 and 
the internet.83  The main purpose in enacting the SCA, as part of the ECPA, 
was to update previous federal legislation and ensure that new forms of 
communication would be afforded the same Fourth Amendment privacy 
protections as more traditional communication methods despite the third-
party doctrine.84  As technology has advanced, courts have applied the 
ECPA and SCA without issue because the underlying electronic 
communications methods have remained relatively similar over time.  
Text messaging, instant messaging, and social media chat programs 
function much like email, in that the communications and customer 
information is stored not only by the consumer on their own device, but 
also in a facility owned by a service provider.  As a result, the SCA has 
been applied to these new forms of communication85 relatively easily, and 
so the SCA has not meaningfully changed since 1986.86 
                                                          
Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.), 829 F.3d 197, 217 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he relevant 
provisions of the SCA focus on protecting the privacy of the content of a user’s stored electronic 
communications.  Although the SCA also prescribes methods under which the government may obtain 
access to that content for law enforcement purposes, it does so in the context of a primary emphasis 
on protecting user content . . . .”), cert. granted, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 6343 (Oct. 16, 2017). 
 82.   Although the first personal computer was released in 1965, it cost more than $3,000 at the 
time and was mostly purchased for use by NASA.  See The Incredible Story of the First PC, from 
1965, PINGDOM (Aug. 28, 2012), http://royal.pingdom.com/2012/08/28/the-first-pc-from-1965/.  
Nowadays, computers come in many different sizes, shapes, colors, and prices. 
 83.   For an overview of the internet, see Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET SOCIETY, 
http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/what-internet/history-internet/brief-history-internet#History 
(last visited Sept. 4, 2017). 
 84.   See supra notes 40–51 and accompanying text. 
 85.   See, e.g., Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 901–03 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(applying SCA to text-message service provider), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. City of Ontario v. 
Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010); Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 989–91 (C.D. 
Cal. 2010) (applying SCA to social-networking sites). 
 86.   One relatively modern advance in technology—cloud computing—has sprung forth a debate 
about the applicability of the SCA.  See generally Ilana R. Kattan, Note, Cloudy Privacy Protections: 
Why the Stored Communications Act Fails to Protect the Privacy of Communications Stored in the 
Cloud, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 617 (2011) (arguing that the SCA is not able to adequately protect 
cloud storage and should be updated to reflect more recent technological advances).  In addition, at 
least two recent bills would have amended the ECPA and SCA.  See International Communications 
Privacy Act, H.R. 5323, 114th Cong. (2016) (amending the federal criminal code and allowing 
governmental entities to require disclosure of communications in the cloud); Email Privacy Act, H.R. 
699 114th Cong. (2016) (proposing an amendment to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 
1986 prohibiting providers of “remote computing service or electronic communication service to the 
public from knowingly divulging to a governmental entity the contents of any communication that is 
in electronic storage or otherwise maintained by the provider, subject to exceptions.”). 
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C. The Microsoft Case 
Microsoft v. United States commenced when the government sought 
to obtain records of an email account potentially used in furtherance of 
narcotics trafficking.87  Magistrate Judge James Francis of the Southern 
District of New York issued an SCA warrant to Microsoft to disclose 
“information associated with a specified web-based e-mail account that is 
stored at premises owned, maintained, controlled, or operated by 
Microsoft Corporation.”88  The warrant directed Microsoft to provide: 
a. The contents of all e-mails stored in the account, including copies of 
e-mails sent from the account; 
b. All records or other information regarding the identification of the 
account, to include full name, physical address, telephone numbers and 
other identifiers, records of session times and durations, the date on 
which the account was created, the length of service, the types of service 
utilized, the IP address used to register the account, log-in IP addresses 
associated with session times and dates, account status, alternative e-mail 
addresses provided during registration, methods of connecting, log files, 
and means and sources of payment (including any credit or bank account 
number); 
c. All records or other information stored by an individual using the 
account, including address books, contact and buddy lists, pictures, and 
files; 
d. All records pertaining to communications between MSN . . . and any 
person regarding the account, including contacts with support services 
and records of actions taken.89 
Microsoft complied with the warrant in part by providing the relevant non-
content information, but it omitted the content information after 
determining that the content information for the target account had been 
transferred to its Dublin datacenter.90  Microsoft moved to quash the 
warrant, objecting on the grounds that Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure generally does not permit warrants for the search and 
                                                          
 87.   See Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re a Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account 
Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.), 829 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 2017 
U.S. LEXIS 6343 (Oct. 16, 2017). 
 88.   In re a Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft 
Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted), rev’d,  829 F.3d 
197 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 6343 (Oct. 16, 2017).  
 89.   Id. 
 90.   Id.  
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seizure of property outside the United States,91 and that the SCA does not 
mention an extraterritorial application.92 
On the issue of extraterritoriality, Judge Francis determined that the 
words “using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure” found in Section 2703(a) were ambiguous.93  Judge Francis 
ultimately denied the motion, indicating that while Microsoft’s argument 
was “not inconsistent with the statutory language, [it was] undermined by 
the structure94 of the SCA, by its legislative history, and by the practical 
consequences that would flow from adopting it.”95 
The main rationale for rejecting Microsoft’s extraterritoriality 
argument was that this particular type of warrant was not like a traditional 
search warrant but more of a “hybrid” between a traditional search warrant 
and a subpoena.96  When issued a subpoena, the recipient is required to 
produce any information requested within its control.97  The court felt that 
since Microsoft owned the server located in Dublin, it was within its 
control and Microsoft was required to produce any documents or 
information with no regard to actual physical location of the server on 
which that information was stored.98  Judge Francis also suggested that 
any concerns with the extraterritoriality of the SCA “are simply not present 
here” because: 
[the] SCA Warrant does not criminalize conduct taking place in a foreign 
country; it does not involve the deployment of American law 
enforcement personnel abroad; it does not require even the physical 
presence of service provider employees at the location where data are 
                                                          
 91.   Id. at 470; see also infra notes 103–04 and accompanying text (discussing Morrison). 
 92.   See In re Microsoft, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 470; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012). 
 93.   In re Microsoft, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 470–71 (noting that this language could either mean “that 
all aspects of Rule 41 are incorporated by reference” or that only the “procedural aspects of the 
application process are to be drawn from Rule 41”) (emphasis added). 
 94.   See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing structure of SCA). 
 95.   In re Microsoft, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 470; see also infra Part III.B (discussing policy concerns). 
 96.   In re Microsoft, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 471 (explaining that an SCA warrant is “obtained like a 
search warrant . . . upon a showing of probable cause . . . [but] is executed like a subpoena in that it is 
served on the ISP in possession of the information and does not involve government agents entering 
the premises of the ISP to search its servers and seize the e-mail account in question”). 
 97.   Id. at 472 (citing In re Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 707 F.2d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 1983); Tiffany 
(NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143, 147–48 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 244 
F.R.D. 179, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); United States v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 584 F. Supp. 1080, 
1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)).   
 98.   The court based this determination on the established principle that a subpoena carries an 
obligation to produce information regardless of its location.  See id.   
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stored.  At least in this instance, it places obligations only on [Microsoft] 
to act within the United States.99 
Microsoft then appealed the decision.100 
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and 
remanded to the district court, instructing the court to quash the warrant.101  
The Second Circuit rejected the approach adopted by Judge Francis to 
categorize an SCA warrant as a “hybrid” between a traditional search 
warrant and a subpoena, and instead interpreted the SCA to use “warrant” 
as a term of art.102  In considering whether the SCA would apply 
extraterritorially, the court began its analysis by reviewing the 
presumption against extraterritoriality outlined in the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Morrison v. National Australian Bank Ltd.103  In Morrison, the 
Court held that laws enacted by Congress are presumed to only apply 
domestically unless there is a “clear indication of an extraterritorial 
application.”104  Because the SCA does not include an explicit 
extraterritorial application, the government conceded this point in 
Microsoft, and the Second Circuit determined that the warrant provisions 
did not contemplate or permit extraterritorial application on their face.105 
The court next analyzed whether the challenged application 
unlawfully applied the particular statute.106  In doing so, the court 
determined the “focus” of the SCA was primarily privacy-based due to the 
statute’s plain meaning,107 its overall framework,108 and its legislative 
history.109  The court also disagreed with the district court’s suggestion 
that the actual physical location of the server did not invoke 
extraterritoriality concerns, specifically because in order to actually 
retrieve the information, Microsoft would have to interact with the Dublin 
                                                          
 99.   In re Microsoft, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 475–76. 
 100.   Microsoft v. United States (In re a Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled 
& Maintained by Microsoft Corp.), 829 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 
6343 (Oct. 16, 2017). 
 101.   Id. at 201–02. 
 102.   See id. at 212–15 (discussing the traditional legal meanings of “warrant” and “subpoena”). 
 103.   Id. at 210 (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Australian Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010)). 
 104.   Id. at 210 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255). 
 105.   Id. at 210, 210 n.19 (citing Recording of Oral Arg. at 1:06:40–1:07:00, 1:25:38–1:26:05). 
 106.   Id. at 220 (citing Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266–67). 
 107.   Id. at 217 (discussing the most natural reading of the language as suggesting privacy as a 
key concern). 
 108.   Id. at 218 (discussing how §§ 2701–2703 all protect against intrusion by unauthorized third 
parties). 
 109.   Id. at 219–20 (discussing how Congress’s goal was to “erect a set of statutory protections 
for stored electronic communications” that would comport with the Fourth Amendment protections 
available elsewhere). 
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datacenter in some way, whether through its domestic systems using the 
internet or by physically going to Ireland.110  The Second Circuit 
concluded that with the SCA’s privacy focus, the execution of the SCA 
warrant in question would be an unlawful extraterritorial application of the 
SCA.111 
Between the district court’s decision and the appeal to the Second 
Circuit, courts in three different cases cited the district court opinion 
approvingly, granting an SCA warrant for data located on foreign 
servers.112  Prior to October 13, 2016, when the Justice Department 
requested a rehearing en banc of the ruling in Microsoft v. United States,113 
only one court had taken a similar position to the Second Circuit’s ruling 
in Microsoft, denying extraterritoriality in the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act.114 
The Second Circuit ultimately denied the government’s request for 
rehearing on January 24, 2017, after failing to receive a majority of votes 
favoring en banc review.115  Nonetheless, five members of the court wrote 
opinions expressing many of the concerns resulting from the prior 
decisions by the district court and the Second Circuit.116  In an opinion 
concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc, Circuit Judge Susan L. 
Carney agreed with the panel’s reasoning in its majority opinion, but 
repeatedly referenced the inadequacy of the SCA in the current state of 
technology.117  The remaining four opinions were authored by the 
                                                          
 110.   See id. at 220 (“Microsoft will necessarily interact with the Dublin datacenter in order to 
retrieve the information . . . .”). 
 111.   Id. at 220–21. 
 112.   See United States v. Martin, No. CR-14-00678-PHX-DGC, 2015 WL 4463934, at *3–4 (D. 
Ariz. July 21, 2015) (following the district court approach and concluding that the SCA warrants 
issued “were not improper exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction” when used to access data on 
Facebook and Twitter servers alleged to be located in Germany); United States v. Scully, 108 F. Supp. 
3d 59, 77–78, 83 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (explaining that the SCA language was ambiguous and adopting 
the approach taken by the district court); In re a Warrant for All Content & Other Info. Associated 
with the Email Account xxxxxxx@Gmail.com Maintained at Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., 33 
F. Supp. 3d 386, 389 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Judge Francis’s rationale for adopting the hybrid 
search warrant approach).  
 113.   Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 21, Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 855 
F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 14-2985). 
 114.   See Elsevier, Inc. v. Grossman, 199 F. Supp. 3d 768, 781–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (interpreting 
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (2012)). 
 115.   Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 855 F.3d 53, 54 (2d Cir. 2017).  With three circuit judges 
recused from the voting, id. at 54 n.*, the panel was split at 4-4, and the rehearing was denied. 
 116.   Id. at 54. 
 117.   See id. at 55 (Carney, J., concurring) (“We recognize at the same time that in many ways 
the SCA has been left behind by technology.”); id. at 59 (Carney, J., concurring) (“Fragmentation, an 
issue raised by the government in its petition and by the dissents here, was not present in the facts 
before the panel, and only further emphasizes the need for a modernized statute.”); id. at 60 (Carney, 
2017 EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION 475 
dissenters.  All of the authoring judges and the parties agreed that the SCA 
lacks a clear textual basis for extraterritoriality,118 but each dissenter 
reiterated as a critical issue of their argument the district court’s 
determination of the irrelevancy of the precise location of the server on 
which the data was located.119 
In the wake of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ denial, the 
controversy is nowhere near settled.  A bonafide circuit split has yet to 
fully manifest, but courts continue to favorably cite to the Second Circuit 
decision in Microsoft, as well as the district court decision it overruled.120  
Ultimately, this dispute is now on track for final resolution by the Supreme 
Court.121 There appears to be significant external support for both sides.122  
The Court must now reach a resolution that creates the best “balance 
                                                          
J., concurring) (“And we can expect that a statute designed afresh to address today’s data realities 
would take an approach different from the SCA’s, and would be cognizant of the mobility of data and 
the varying privacy regimes of concerned sovereigns, as well as the potentially conflicting obligations 
placed on global service providers like Microsoft.”). 
 118.   E.g., id. at 55 (Carney, J., concurring) (“[I]t is common ground that Congress did not intend 
for the SCA’s warrant procedures to apply extraterritorially.”); id. at 60 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (“As 
all seem to agree, and as the government concedes, the Act lacks extraterritorial reach.”). 
 119.   See id. at 61 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (“[N]o extraterritorial reach is needed to require delivery 
in the United States of the information sought, which is easily accessible in the United States at a 
computer terminal.”); id. at 63 (Cabranes, J., dissenting) (“The panel majority ignored the fact that 
Microsoft lawfully had possession of the emails; that Microsoft had access to the emails in the United 
States; and that Microsoft’s disclosure of the emails to the government would take place in the United 
States.”); id. at 70 (Raggi, J., dissenting) (“It is simply unprecedented to conclude that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality bars United States courts with personal jurisdiction over a United States 
person from ordering that person to produce property in his possession (wherever located) when the 
government has made a probable cause showing that the property is evidence of a crime.”); id. at 76 
(Droney, J., dissenting) (“Microsoft has possession and immediate access to those emails regardless 
of where it chose to store them.”). 
 120.   As of September 2017, the District Court decision has been cited eight times, the Second 
Circuit decision has been cited twenty-three times, and the rehearing denial has been cited fourteen 
times. 
 121.   The Justice Department’s petition for writ of certiorari was granted on October 16, 2017.  
Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 6343 (Oct. 16, 2016).  
 122.   See, e.g., Allison Grande, State AGs Press High Court to Take on Microsoft Warrant 
Row, LAW360 (Aug. 2, 2017, 10:48 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/950796?scroll=1 
(describing amicus brief in which state attorneys general ask the Supreme Court to reverse the Second 
Circuit because its ruling allows “businesses to unfairly dodge an obligation to cooperate in criminal 
probes”); Peter J. Henning, Digital Privacy to Come under Supreme Court’s Scrutiny, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/10/business/dealbook/digital-privacy-
supreme-court.html?mcubz=3 (“Those requests are often granted because the justices rely on the 
solicitor general’s office to identify cases that have significant law enforcement implications.”); 
Sophia Morris, Google Won’t Challenge Warrants For Overseas Data: DOJ, LAW360 (Sept. 14, 
2017, 6:04 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/964048/google-won-t-challenge-warrants-for-
overseas-data-doj; Steven Trader, Feds Ask Justices To Review Microsoft Overseas Warrant Win, 
LAW360 (June 26, 2017, 8:01 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/938342. 
476 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 66 
between privacy interests and law enforcement needs in a digital 
world.”123 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A. SCA & The Microsoft Case 
The SCA inadequately protects the most common forms of electronic 
communications in modern society.  While at one time the SCA applied 
the Fourth Amendment to electronic communications appropriately, 
advances in technology mean that the statute is being applied in situations 
and to forms of electronic communication that the legislature in 1986 
could not have predicted.  The SCA is narrowly written with an eye 
towards providing Fourth Amendment-like protections for electronic 
communications taking place on pre-internet computer networks.  With 
the internet, traditional understandings of international borders are 
becoming obsolete.  On its face, the SCA is unclear as to how far 
geographically the statute reaches.  Because the plain language of Section 
2703(a) is unclear regarding extraterritoriality, courts must consider 
congressional intent based on its overall structure established thirty years 
ago, a scant legislative history that equally supports two opposing views, 
and a privacy-focus that has changed substantially over time.  While in 
1986 the SCA was sufficient to fulfill its intended purpose—granting 
electronic communications equivalent protection under the Fourth 
Amendment—it no longer serves that purpose and should be updated to 
reflect technological changes in the past thirty years and in such a way that 
contemplates future advances. 
1. SCA Warrant as Hybrid Search Warrant? 
The district court’s decision to categorize an SCA warrant as a 
“hybrid” between a traditional search warrant and a subpoena aligns with 
the statutory provisions.  The structure of the SCA allows the government 
the option to obtain an SCA warrant for any information but only requires 
a warrant supported by probable cause for the contents of emails made 
within the previous 180 days.124  In other words, in situations where the 
                                                          
 123.   Allison Grande, In Microsoft, Justices To Set Feds’ Reach For Overseas Data, LAW360 
(Oct. 17, 2017, 2:53 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/974907/in-microsoft-justices-to-set-feds-
reach-for-overseas-data. 
 124.   See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012) (referring to a warrant issued in conformance with the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which further require probable cause.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 
41(d)(1)). 
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government is not required to obtain a warrant, it will not be motivated to 
do so and will instead probably seek a subpoena, which compels a service 
provider to provide the records even if they are overseas.125  Even where 
an SCA warrant is obtained, there is no functional difference between the 
SCA warrant and a subpoena for service providers like Microsoft, who 
will ultimately disclose the information. 
More than likely, after being issued a subpoena Microsoft will direct 
an employee or representative to obtain the non-content records requested 
therein by accessing the data stored in the Dublin datacenter through the 
internet from a location in the United States.  Alternative methods, like 
having a Dublin-based employee personally deliver the records to the 
United States or paying for a U.S.-based employee to retrieve the records 
from Dublin, would be implausible, cost-inefficient, and needlessly 
timely.  Had Microsoft chosen to comply fully with the SCA warrant, their 
process for obtaining the relevant data would be the same: a Microsoft 
employee or representative would have accessed the data through the 
internet from a physical location within the United States.  Even though 
the SCA does use the term of art “warrant,” whether the legislature 
intended for an SCA warrant to fully mirror traditional search warrants 
issued under the Fourth Amendment is unclear, as demonstrated by the 
conflicting opinions issued by the Southern District of New York and the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, as well as many other courts since.126 
If SCA warrants are treated as hybrid search warrants in the way the 
district court would have allowed, there will be both legal and practical 
advantages and disadvantages.  The main benefit of this approach is that 
access to electronic communications records will not be placed completely 
out of the reach of lawful government investigations by being stored 
abroad.  In order to obtain an SCA warrant, the government must still show 
probable cause in accordance with the Fourth Amendment and the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure,127 but the service provider will not be able 
to conceal these records by moving them to a server in a foreign country 
to save money or, in the case of a customer request, by incorrectly telling 
the service provider he or she is in Dublin. 
                                                          
 125.   In re a Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft 
Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“It has long been the law that a subpoena requires 
the recipient to produce information in its possession, custody, or control regardless of the location of 
that information.”) (citing Marc Rich & Co., A.G. v. United States, 707 F.2d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 
1983)), rev’d, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 6343 (Oct. 16, 2017). 
 126.   See supra notes 112–14, 120 and accompanying text. 
 127.   See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012) (incorporating the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
including FED. R. CRIM. P. 41). 
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As at least one commentator has pointed out after the district court’s 
decision, this application of the SCA also offends “international 
comity.”128  Substantial commentary on this case arose after the district 
court rendered its decision and focused primarily on the extraterritorial 
implications of that decision.129  For a traditional search warrant that 
relates to searches or seizures made overseas, the government must rely 
on treaties with foreign nations—mutual legal assistance treaties 
(“MLATs”).130  The hybrid approach may give the government too much 
power and allow it to circumvent international laws and the MLAT process 
to obtain electronic records that are otherwise protected.131 
2. SCA Warrant as Traditional Search Warrant? 
The Second Circuit treated SCA warrants as traditional search 
warrants, which is an equally sound determination based a plain meaning 
interpretation of the SCA.  However, the ambiguity in the statute and the 
paucity of legislative history on the matter could be interpreted either way.  
The legislature could have intended for an SCA warrant to mirror 
traditional search warrants completely or it could have meant to heighten 
the requirement to obtain an SCA warrant in procedure alone but still 
compel the service provider to produce the electronic communication 
records.  The Second Circuit’s reasoning ignores the actual method by 
which service providers will comply with an SCA warrant in these types 
of situations.  The Second Circuit also made a critical determination by 
deciding that the physical location of the server is highly important.  Once 
this decision was made, a favorable outcome for Microsoft was all but 
guaranteed because the location of the data on the server in Dublin was 
undisputed.  Unless stated otherwise, a U.S. statute is strongly presumed 
to not apply extraterritorially.132  The rest of the court’s analysis hinges on 
this determination. 
                                                          
 128.   Lindsay La Marca, Note, I Got 99 Problems and a Warrant Is One: How Current 
Interpretations of the Stored Communications Act Offend International Comity, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
971, 973 (2016). 
 129.   See, e.g., Alexander Dugas Battey Jr., Comment, A Step in the Wrong Direction: The Case 
for Restraining the Extraterritorial Application of the Stored Communications Act, 42 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 262 (2016) (discussing Morrison, conflict of international laws, process for 
mutual legal assistance treaties, and suggesting modernization of data transfer procedures between 
sovereign nations); La Marca, supra note 128, (discussing the SCA, the Fourth Amendment, and the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure synergy, as well as Morrison and mutual legal assistance treaties 
procedures; then making suggestions for legislative reform). 
 130.   See La Marca, supra note 128, at 992–93. 
 131.   Id. 
 132.   Morrison v. National Australian Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 248 (2010). 
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Treating an SCA warrant as a traditional warrant also has advantages 
and disadvantages.  The government’s power would be limited to 
obtaining only those records that are within its jurisdictional control or 
covered by an MLAT.  Concerns with extraterritoriality, or circumventing 
international laws, are rendered moot.  As indicated previously, however, 
the SCA only requires the government to obtain a warrant for contents of 
electronic communications made within the previous 180 days.  If service 
providers comply with an SCA warrant in the same way as a subpoena 
issued for the same or similar records (offset by the temporal limits of the 
SCA), the practical difference between these two is nearly nonexistent.  
Just as Microsoft has done, service providers will refuse to produce 
records requested by SCA warrant.  The largest negative effect is that with 
no access to content records from the previous 180 days stored in a specific 
location by a service provider, government investigations will be severely 
hindered because of a business decision by a service provider to save 
money by locating its servers overseas.  Ultimately, the SCA’s “warrant” 
can plausibly be interpreted as a traditional search warrant or a subpoena.  
Advances in technology and the prevalence of email and other forms of 
digital communication necessitate an increasing reliance on third-party 
service providers who are storing that data.  This change has revealed an 
ambiguity in the SCA that was easily overlooked by Congress in 1986, 
with the SCA no longer sufficiently serving its original purpose. 
3. The “Correct” Outcome 
Either of the interpretations given throughout the proceedings of 
Microsoft are “correct.”  Both the district court and the Second Circuit 
applied the proper statutory interpretation rules, but in the end, they 
produced entirely different results.  Nonetheless, the hybrid approach 
taken by the district court is a better outcome because the SCA warrants 
are limited in subject matter in that they are only being issued on service 
providers to provide records of email and other electronic 
communications.  Congress’ attempt to remove these records from the 
confines of the third-party doctrine has resulted in an incompatible result.  
An SCA warrant directs service providers to produce the same exact sorts 
of records as a subpoena, the only difference being how recently the 
communications may have been sent. 
Once one takes into account the technical differences between 
electronic communications as they occurred in 1986—via individual 
computer networking and before the internet—versus the methods used 
for email, text messaging, instant messaging, and other forms of modern 
electronic communications, the urgency to fix the SCA is apparent.  Back 
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in 1986, any records that would have been subject to the SCA were likely 
communications between parties in the United States that travelled 
directly between them and were only stored in two domestic locations—
the computer of the sender and the computer of the receiver.  Whereas 
now, an email or text message between the same two parties could travel 
between numerous locations worldwide, all in the blink of an eye, and 
ultimately end up “stored” on a data server in Ireland.  Also, as noted by 
one of the dissenters in the denial of the rehearing en banc, some service 
providers are already undermining the effectiveness of an SCA warrant in 
light of the Second Circuit’s decision by refusing to disclose information 
stored abroad.133 
Seeing courts adopt the hybrid approach also invokes a more 
immediate basis for change by the legislature than continuing to treat an 
SCA warrant as a traditional search warrant would.  Consider the path that 
most new communications technologies have undergone before eventually 
being given Fourth Amendment-like protections.134  Usually when a new 
technology is created, it is adopted by the public, and eventually the 
government will find a way to track or reach those communications.  Then, 
those technologies will either be granted Fourth Amendment protections 
in the form of a judicial decision or by the legislature in the form of a 
statute.135  Email, while technically covered under the SCA, is a fairly new 
form of electronic communication, or at least different enough from the 
electronic communications that existed in 1986 when the SCA was 
enacted, to justify new protections.  Microsoft is an opportunity for the 
courts and legislature to ensure that new forms of electronic 
communication are guaranteed the protections they deserve under the 
Fourth Amendment.  Whether that comes in the form of a Supreme Court 
decision, an amendment to the SCA, or an entirely new statute by the 
legislature, a change is needed. 
                                                          
 133.   Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 855 F.3d 53, 64–65 (2d Cir. 2017) (Cabranes, J., 
dissenting) (explaining that Google will now only disclose information already stored in the United 
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abroad is preserved), cert. granted, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 6343 (Oct. 16, 2017). 
 134.   See supra notes 32–51 and accompanying text (discussing how technological change has 
historically involved initial reluctance and eventual expansion of the Fourth Amendment). 
 135.   A historical example of this process is the courts’ review of law enforcement’s wiretapping 
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cellphones.  See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (warrantless search of cell phone in search 
incident to arrest violated the Fourth Amendment); but see United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 
(6th Cir. 2016) (use of cell phone tower data to track location did not constitute a Fourth Amendment 
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B.  Effects & Policy Considerations 
Either interpretation—SCA warrant as hybrid search warrant or SCA 
warrant as a traditional search warrant—raises legitimate policy concerns.  
Treating an SCA warrant as a traditional search warrant limits the reach of 
a legitimate government investigation in obtaining electronic 
communications of suspects or criminal defendants.  But since the 
government in no way regulates the service providers as to data storage 
and the internet allows transfer of data across the world in an instant, 
Microsoft and others are free to store these records on any server within 
their control.  The applicability of the SCA should not hinge on a purely 
business-based decision because this allows private entities to dictate how 
the law will apply in certain situations.136 
Consequently, since the data storage policies of service providers like 
Microsoft are not regulated, they have no incentive to take any extra steps 
to adhere to federal laws like the SCA in regards to where they store their 
data for the benefit of the government.  Since the records are stored based 
on customer-provided location information, any individual with nefarious 
means can successfully conceal electronic communications from 
governmental access by lying about their actual locations when they sign 
up for a new service.  Even law-abiding individuals who are concerned 
about their privacy may want to protect their electronic communications 
from prying government eyes if they know they can avoid it by merely 
telling their ISP they are from a different country. 
C. Updating the SCA 
Updating the SCA,137 and other similarly outdated statutes, to address 
the issues in Microsoft Corp. and to more accurately reflect advances in 
technology would help courts more accurately address the above issues 
regarding electronic communications and other data.  For instance, the 
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 enabled the government to track and intercept 
nearly all forms of communication by creating new crimes and procedures 
and making sweeping amendments to many different sections of the Code, 
all as a powerful response by Congress to the terrorist attacks on 9/11.138  
                                                          
 136.   The obvious criminal investigations at stake involve email-based crimes, like fraud in the 
form of email or phishing scams.  However, as the internet continues to be a part of our lives, more 
and more forms of crime will likely start to cross over into the digital world, e.g. cyber-bullying, 
internet-initiated sex crimes, et al.  
 137.   See Kerr, Next Generation, supra note 57, at 411–18 (discussing suggestions for updating 
the entire ECPA). 
 138.   Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
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Also, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were updated in 2015 with 
fairly substantial e-discovery amendments.139  Updating the SCA is not as 
complex as it may appear at first blush.  Electronic communications and 
other forms of data are nothing more than intangible assets, which courts 
have been dealing with for much longer than they realize: 
[T]he jurisdictional challenges presented by the global cloud are not 
conceptually as novel as they seem.  Despite the technological wizardry 
of modern life, the “cloud” is actually a network of storage drives bolted 
to a particular territory, and there is substantial case law suggesting that 
courts think of data as a physical object.  Moreover, even if the cloud 
were a free-floating ether, data can be thought of as an intangible asset, 
like money or debt, which flows across borders; courts have been 
adjudicating such jurisdictional disputes for centuries.  These precedents 
suggest numerous grounds for states to assert jurisdiction over data—not 
a single test, as major Internet companies claim.140 
Some amendments to the SCA have already been proposed.  The most 
recent, the Email Privacy Act, sought to address some of the concerns 
raised in this Note by changing the usage of “divulge” in some sections to 
“disclose” and clarifying some procedural requirements.141  Other 
proposed amendments have sought to eliminate the 180-day rule.142 
At a minimum, Congress should amend the SCA to address the 
extraterritoriality issue.  If it chooses to simply include a provision 
regarding whether the law should apply extraterritorially, that will at least 
solve one aspect of the dispute between service providers, like Microsoft, 
and the government.  But Congress should not limit itself to applying a 
band-aid on the current law.  Either a complete overhaul or an entirely new 
statute would be better.  A new framework that better serves the 
government’s ability to obtain electronic communications information, as 
well as individual privacy concerns, will shield courts from criticism after 
applying an outdated statute to modern technologies.  This new version of 
the SCA should provide guidelines for ISPs on where and how to store 
their customers’ data, as well as a warrant/subpoena procedure for 
situations where a U.S.-based company has chosen to transfer data to 
                                                          
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 
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another country for purely economic reasons. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The drafters of the Fourth Amendment recognized the importance of 
privacy and sought to protect individuals from unreasonable searches and 
seizures of their property by the government.  At first, protections were 
limited to the home, but eventually were interpreted to include public areas 
where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.  Then, the 
reasonable expectation of privacy afforded in certain contexts was 
interpreted to exclude information and records voluntarily disclosed to 
third parties.  As technology continued to advance, Congress felt it 
necessary to protect certain forms of information by granting Fourth 
Amendment-like protections through statutory frameworks for new types 
of physical and electronic records. 
In the SCA, Congress sought to protect electronic communications 
disclosed and stored by third-party service providers.  The SCA has 
operated for the past thirty years with relative consistency and has been 
interpreted to include newer forms of digital communication, like text 
messaging and social media programs.  However, as seen in Microsoft, the 
time has come to update the SCA to clear up the ambiguities that have 
arisen because of advances in technology.  In Microsoft, the Second 
Circuit held that the SCA did not contemplate an extraterritorial 
application and thus Microsoft did not have to produce emails stored on a 
server in a foreign country.  This decision is the incorrect outcome because 
an SCA warrant is more like a subpoena, or at least a hybrid between a 
subpoena and a traditional search warrant. 
Going forward, the SCA must be updated to reflect technology 
changes over the past thirty years and to reflect changes that may appear 
in the future.  Meanwhile, courts should interpret the SCA in a way that 
treats SCA warrants more like subpoenas, as the district court in Microsoft 
indicated.  Doing so is more in line with the structure of the SCA than an 
alternative approach.  Further, this interpretation alleviates any potential 
circumvention of legitimate criminal investigations where the government 
would otherwise be shut off from obtaining electronic communications 
records due to either a business decision made by a service provider or a 
conscious decision by a customer to conceal their records by providing 
misleading information to the service provider.  As technology continues 
to improve, courts and the legislature must be constantly vigilant of the 
existing laws and their continuing applicability.  Should the opportunity 
for individuals to take advantage of gaps in statutory provisions arise, the 
law should be quick to address these shortcomings. 
